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Abstract
We consider a multi-organizational system in which each organization contributes processors to the
global pool but also jobs to be processed on the common resources. The fairness of the scheduling
algorithm is essential for the stability and even for the existence of such systems (as organizations may
refuse to join an unfair system).
We consider on-line, non-clairvoyant scheduling of sequential jobs. The started jobs cannot be
stopped, canceled, preempted, or moved to other processors. We consider identical processors, but
most of our results can be extended to related or unrelated processors.
We model the fair scheduling problem as a cooperative game and we use the Shapley value to deter-
mine the ideal fair schedule. In contrast to the previous works, we do not use money to assess the relative
utilities of jobs. Instead, to calculate the contribution of an organization, we determine how the presence
of this organization influences the performance of other organizations. Our approach can be used with
arbitrary utility function (e.g., flow time, tardiness, resource utilization), but we argue that the utility
function should be strategy resilient. The organizations should be discouraged from splitting, merging
or delaying their jobs. We present the unique (to within a multiplicative and additive constants) strategy
resilient utility function.
We show that the problem of fair scheduling is NP-hard and hard to approximate. However, we
show that the problem parameterized with the number of organizations is fixed parameter tractable
(FPT). Also, for unit-size jobs, we present a fully polynomial-time randomized approximation scheme
(FPRAS). Although for the large number of the organizations the problem is computationally hard, the
presented exponential algorithm can be used as a fairness benchmark.
All our algorithms are greedy, i.e., they don’t leave free processors if there are waiting jobs. We
show that any greedy algorithm results in at most 25% loss of the resource utilization in comparison
with the globally optimal algorithm. As a corollary we conclude that the resource underutilization, being
the result of the fairness requirement, is (tightly) upper bounded by 0.25.
We propose a heuristic scheduling algorithm for the fair scheduling problem. We experimentally
evaluate the heuristic and compare its fairness to fair share, round robin and the exact exponential algo-
rithm. Our results show that fairness of the heuristic algorithm is close to the optimal. The difference
between our heuristic and the fair share algorithm is more visible on longer traces with more organiza-
tions. These results show that assigning static target shares (as in the fair share algorithm) is not fair in
multi-organizational systems and that instead dynamic measures of organizations’ contributions should
be used.
Keywords: fair scheduling, cooperative game theory, Shapley value, multi-organization,
cooperation, strategy resistance, approximation algorithms, inapproximability, fairness.
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1 Introduction
In multi-organizational systems, participating organizations give access to their local resources; in return
their loads can be processed on other resources. The examples of such systems include PlanetLab1, grids
(Grid50002, EGEE3) or organizationally distributed storage systems [17]. There are many incentives for
federating into consortia: the possibility of decreasing the costs of management and maintenance (one
large system can be managed more efficiently than several smaller ones), but also the willingness to utilize
resources more efficiently. Peak loads can be offloaded to remote resources. Moreover, organizations can
access specialized resources or the whole platform (which permits e.g. testing on a large scale).
In the multi-organizational and multi-user systems fairness of the resource allocation mechanisms is
equally important as its efficiency. Efficiency of BitTorrent depends on users’ collaboration, which in turn
requires the available download bandwidth to be distributed fairly [35]. Fairness has been also discussed in
storage systems [4,15,16,18,40,41,45] and computer networks [42]. In scheduling, for instance, a significant
part of the description of Maui [20], perhaps the most common cluster scheduler, focuses on the fair-share
mechanism. Nevertheless there is no universal agreement on the meaning of fairness; next, we review
approaches most commonly used in literature: distributive fairness and game theory.
In distributive fairness organizations are ensured a fraction of the resources according to predefined
(given) shares. The share of an organization may depend on the perceived importance of the workload, pay-
ments [4,15,16,40]; or calculated to satisfy (predefined) service level agreements [18,22,45]. The literature
on distributive fairness describes algorithms distributing resources according to the given shares, but does
not describe how the shares should be set. In scheduling, distributive fairness is implemented through fair
queuing mechanism: YFQ [1], SFQ and FSFQ [11,21], or their modifications [4,15,16,18,40,41,45,46].
A different approach is to optimize directly the performance (the utility) of users, rather than just the
allocated resources. [25] proposes an axiomatic characterization of fairness based on multi-objective opti-
mization; [37] applies this concept to scheduling in a multi-organizational system. Inoie et al. [19] proposes
a similar approach for load balancing: a fair solution must be Pareto-optimal and the revenues of the players
must be proportional to the revenues in Nash equilibrium.
While distributive fairness might be justified in case of centrally-managed systems (e.g. Amazon EC2
or a single HPC center), in our opinion it is inappropriate for consortia (e.g., PlanetLab or non-commercial
scientific systems like Grid5000 or EGEE) in which there is no single “owner” and the participating orga-
nizations may take actions (e.g. rescheduling jobs on their resources, adding local resources, or isolating
into subsystems). In such systems the shares of the participating organizations should depend both on their
workload and on the owned resources; intuitively an organization that contributes many “useful” machines
should be favored; similarly an organization that has only a few jobs.
If agents may form binding agreements, cooperative game theory studies the stability of resulting agree-
ments (coalitions and revenues). The Shapley value [38], the established solution concept that characterizes
what is a fair distribution of the total revenue of the coalition between the participating agents, has been
used in scheduling theory. However, all the models we are aware of use the concept of money. The works of
Carroll et at. [3], Mishra et al. [29], Mashayekhy and Grosu [28] and Moulin et al. [30] describe algorithms
and the process of forming the coalitions for scheduling. These works assume that each job has a certain
monetary value for the issuing organization and each organization has its initial monetary budget.
Money may have negative consequences on the stakeholders of resource-sharing consortia. Using (or
even mentioning) money discourages people from cooperating [39]. This stays in sharp contrast with the
idea behind the academic systems — sharing the infrastructure is a step towards closer cooperation. Addi-
tionally, we believe that using money is inconvenient in non-academic systems as well. In many contexts, it
1www.planet-lab.org/
2www.grid5000.fr
3egee-technical.web.cern.ch
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is not clear how to valuate the completion of the job or the usage of a resource (especially when workload
changes dynamically). We think that the accurate valuation is equally important (and perhaps equally diffi-
cult) as the initial problem of fair scheduling. Although auctions [2] or commodity markets [24] have been
proposed to set prices, these approaches implicitly require to set the reference value to determine profitabil-
ity. Other works on monetary game-theoretical models for scheduling include [9,10,13,14,34]; monetary
approach is also used for other resource allocation problems, e.g. network bandwidth allocation [44]. How-
ever, none of these works describes how to valuate jobs and resources.
In a non-monetary approach proposed by Dutot el al. [6] the jobs are scheduled to minimize the global
performance metric (the makespan) with an additional requirement — the utility of each player cannot be
worse than if the player would act alone. Such approach ensures the stability of the system against actions of
any single user (it is not profitable for the user to leave the system and to act alone) but not to the formation
of sub-coalitions.
In the selfish job model [31] the agents are the jobs that selfishly choose processors on which to execute.
Similarly to our model the resources are shared and treated as common good; however, no agent contributes
resources.
An alternative to scheduling is to allow jobs to share resources concurrently. In congestion games [5,
32,36] the utility of the player using a resource R depends on the number of the players concurrently us-
ing R; the players are acting selfishly. Congestion games for divisible load scheduling were analyzed by
Grosu et. al [12].
In this paper we propose fair scheduling algorithms for systems composed of multiple organizations
(in contrast to the case of multiple organizations using a system owned by a single entity). We model
the organizations, their machines and their jobs as a cooperative game. In this game we do not use the
concept of money. When measuring the contribution of the organization O we analyze how the presence
of O in the grand coalition influences the completion times of the jobs of all participating organization.
This contribution is expressed in the same units as the utility of the organization. In the design of the fair
algorithm we use the concept of Shapley value. In contrast to simple cooperative game, in our case the value
of the coalition (the total utility of the organizations in this coalition) depends on the underlying scheduling
algorithm. This makes the problem of calculating the contributions of the organizations more involved.
First we develop algorithms for arbitrary utilities (e.g. resource utilization, tardiness, flow time, etc.). Next
we argue that designing the scheduling mechanism itself is not enough; we show that the utility function
must be chosen to discourage organizations from manipulating their workloads (e.g. merging or splitting
the jobs — similar ideas have been proposed for the money-based models [30]). We present an exponential
scheduling algorithm for the strategy resilient utility function. We show that the fair scheduling problem is
NP-hard and difficult to approximate. For a simpler case, when all the jobs are unit-size, we present a fully
polynomial-time randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS). According to our experiments this algorithm
is close to the optimum when used as a heuristics for workloads with different sizes of the jobs.
Our contribution is the following:
1. We derive the definition of the fair algorithm from the cooperative game theory axioms (Defini-
tions 3.1 and 3.2, Algorithm 1 and Theorem 3). The algorithm uses only the notions regarding the
performance of the system (no money-based mechanisms).
2. We present the axioms (Section 4) and the definition of the fair utility function (Theorem 4.1) —
this function is similar to the flow time metric but the differences make it strategy-resilient (Proposi-
tion 4.2).
3. We show that the fair scheduling problem is NP-complete (Theorem 5.1) and hard to approximate
(Theorem 5.3). However, the problem parameterized with the number of organizations is fixed pa-
rameter tractable (FPT).
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4. We present an FPRAS for a special case with unit-size jobs (Algorithm 6, Theorems 5.6 and 5.7).
5. We show the tight bounds on the resource underutilization due to the fairness of the algorithm. Our
result is even more general and applies to all greedy algorithms (i.e. such algorithms that at every
time moment in which there is a free processor and a non-empty set of ready, but not scheduled jobs,
schedules some job on some free processor).
6. We propose a practical heuristic that schedules jobs according to an estimated Shapley value. The
heuristic estimates the contribution of an organization by the number of CPU-timeunits an organi-
zation contributes for computing jobs of other organizations; the algorithm schedules the jobs to
minimize the maximal difference between the utility and the contribution over all organizations.
7. Finally, we conduct simulation experiments to verify fairness of commonly-used scheduling algo-
rithms (Section 7). The experiments show that although the fair share algorithm is considerably better
than round robin (which does not aim to optimize fairness), our heuristic constantly outperforms fair
share, being close to the optimal algorithm and the randomized approximation algorithm. The main
conclusion from the experimental part of this paper is that ensuring that each party is given a fair share
of resources (the distributive fairness approach) might not be sufficient in systems with dynamic job
arrival patterns. An algorithm based on the Shapley value, that explicitly considers the organization’s
impact on other organizations’ utilities, produces more fair schedules.
In this paper we use very mild assumptions about the jobs. We do not require to know their valuations,
durations, or their future incoming pattern. Thus, we believe the presented results have practical conse-
quences for real-life job schedulers. Also, our exponential algorithm forms a benchmark for comparing
the fairness of other polynomial-time scheduling algorithms. The experimental comparison of some real
scheduling algorithms suggests that the polynomial-time heuristic algorithms inspired by the ones presented
in this paper often result in a better fairness than the currently most popular fair share algorithm.
2 Preliminaries
Organizations, machines, jobs. We consider a system built by a set of independent organizations O =
{O(1), O(2), . . . O(k)}. Each organization O(u) owns a computational cluster consisting of m(u) machines
(processors) denoted as M (u)1 ,M (u)2 , . . .M (u)m(u) and produces its jobs, denoted as J
(u)
1 , J
(u)
2 , . . . . Each job
J
(u)
i has release time r
(u)
i ∈ T, where T is a discrete set of time moments. We consider an on-line problem
in which each job is unknown until its release time. We consider a non-clairvoyant model i.e., the job’s
processing time is unknown until the job completes (hence we do not need to use imprecise [26] run-time
estimates). For the sake of simplicity of the presentation we assume that machines are identical, i.e. each job
J
(u)
i can be executed at any machine and its processing always takes p
(u)
i time units; p
(u)
i is the processing
time. Most of the results, however, can be extended to the case of related machines, where p(u)i is a function
of the schedule – the only exception make the results in Section 5.1, where we rely on the assumption that
each job processed on any machine takes exactly one time unit. The results even generalize to the case of
unrelated machines, however if we assume non-clairvoyant model with unrelated machines (i.e., we do not
know the processing times of the jobs on any machine) then we cannot optimize the assignment of jobs to
machines.
The jobs are sequential (this is a standard assumption in many scheduling models and, particularly, in
the selfish job model [31]; an alternative is to consider the parallel jobs, which we plan to do in the future).
Once a job is started, the scheduler cannot preempt it or migrate it to other machine (this assumption is usual
in HPC scheduling because of high migration costs). Finally, we assume that the jobs of each individual
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organization should be started in the order in which they are presented. This allows organizations to have an
internal prioritization of their jobs.
Cooperation, schedules. Organizations can cooperate and share their infrastructure; in such case we
say that organizations form a coalition. Formally, a coalition C is a subset of the set of all organizations,
C ⊆ O. We also consider a specific coalition consisting of all organizations, which we call a grand coalition
and denote as Cg (formally, Cg = O, but in some contexts we use the notation Cg to emphasize that we
are referring to the set of the organizations that cooperate). The coalition must agree on the schedule σ =⋃
(u)
⋃
i{(J
(u)
i , s
(u)
i ,M(J
(u)
i ))} which is a set of triples; a triple (J
(u)
i , s
(u)
i ,M(J
(u)
i )) denotes a job J (u)i
started at time moment s(u)i ≥ r
(u)
i on machine M(J
(u)
i ). We assume that a machine executes at most
one job at any time moment. We often identify a job J (u)i with a pair (s(u)i , p(u)i ); and a schedule with⋃
(u)
⋃
i{(s
(u)
i , p
(u)
i ))} (we do so for a more compact presentation of our results). The coalition uses all the
machines of its participants and schedules consecutive tasks on available machines. We consider only greedy
schedules: at any time moment if there is a free processor and a non-empty set of ready, but not scheduled
jobs, some job must be assigned to the free processor. Since we do not know neither the characteristics
of the future workload nor the duration of the started but not yet completed jobs, any non-greedy policy
would result in unnecessary delays in processing jobs. Also, such greedy policies are used in real-world
schedulers [20].
Let J denote the set of all possible sets of the jobs. An online scheduling algorithm (in short a scheduling
algorithm) A : J × T → O is an online algorithm that continuously builds a schedule: for a given time
moment t ∈ T such that there is a free machine in t and a set of jobs released before t but not yet scheduled:
J ∈ J,A(J , t) returns the organization the task of which should be started. The set of all possible schedules
produced by such algorithms is the set of feasible schedules and denoted by Γ. We recall that in each feasible
schedule the tasks of a single organization are started in a FIFO order.
Objectives. We consider a utility function ψ : Γ × O × T → R that for a given schedule σ ∈ Γ, an
organization O(u), and a time moment t gives the value corresponding to the O(u) organization’s satisfaction
from a schedule σ until t. The examples of such utility functions that are common in scheduling theory are:
flow time, resource utilization, turnaround, etc. Our scheduling algorithms will only use the notions of the
utilities and do not require any external payments.
Since a schedule σ is fully determined by a scheduling algorithm A and a coalition of organizations C,
we often identify ψ(A, C, O(u), t) with appropriate ψ(σ,O(u), t). Also, we use a shorter notation ψ(u)(C)
instead of ψ(A, C, O(u), t) whenever the A and t are known from the context. We define the characteristic
function v : Γ × T → R describing the total utility of the organizations from a schedule: v(A, C, t) =∑
O(u)∈C ψ(A, C, O
(u), t). Analogously as above, we can use an equivalent formulation:
v(σ, t) =
∑
O(u)∈C ψ(σ,O
(u), t), also using a shorter notations v(C) whenever it is possible. Note that the
utilities of the organizations ψ(u)(C) constitute a division of the value of the coalition v(C).
3 Fair scheduling based on the Shapley value
In this section our goal is to find a scheduling algorithm A that in each time moment t ensures a fair
distribution of the value of the coalition v(C) between the participating organizations. We will denote
this desired fair division of the value v as φ(1)(v), φ(2)(v), . . . , φ(k)(v) meaning that φ(u)(v) denotes the
ideally fair revenue (utility) obtained by organization O(u). We would like the values φ(u)(v) to satisfy the
fairness properties, first proposed by Shapley [38] (below we give intuitive motivations; see [38] for further
arguments).
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1. efficiency – the total value v(C) is distributed:∑
O(u)∈C
φ(u)(v(C)) = v(C).
2. symmetry – the organizations O(u) and O(u′) having indistinguishable contributions obtain the same
profits:(
∀C′⊂C:O(u),O(u′) /∈C′ v(C
′ ∪ {O(u)}) = v(C′ ∪ {O(u
′)})
)
⇒ φ(u)(v(C)) = φ(u
′)(v(C)).
3. additivity – for any two characteristic functions v and w and a function (v+w): ∀C′⊆C (v+w)(C′) =
v(C′) + w(C′) we have that ∀C′⊆C ∀u:
φ(u)((v+w)(C)) = φ(u)(v(C)) + φ(u)(w(C)).
Consider any two independent schedules σ1 and σ2 that together form a schedule σ3 = σ1∪σ2 (σ1 and
σ2 are independent iff removing any subset of the jobs from σ1 does not influence the completion time
of any job in σ2 and vice versa). The profit of an organization that participates only in one schedule
(say σ1) must be the same in case of σ1 and σ3 (intuitively: the jobs that do not influence the current
schedule, also do not influence the current profits). The profit of every organization that participates
in both schedules should in σ3 be the sum of the profits in σ1 and σ2. Intuitively: if the schedules are
independent then the profits are independent too.
4. dummy – an organization that does not increase the value of any coalition C ′ ⊂ C gets nothing:(
∀C′⊂C : v(C
′ ∪ {O(u)}) = v(C′)
)
⇒ φ(u)(v(C)) = 0.
Since the four properties are actually the axioms of the Shapley value [38], they fully determine the
single mapping between the coalition values and the profits of organizations (known as the Shapley value).
In game theory the Shapley value is considered the classic mechanism ensuring the fair division of the
revenue of the coalition4 . The Shapley value can be computed by the following formula [38]:
φ(u)(v(C)) =
∑
C′⊆C\{O(u)}
‖C′‖!(‖C‖ − ‖C′‖ − 1)!
‖C‖!
(
v
(
C′ ∪ {O(u)}
)
− v
(
C′
))
(1)
LetLC denote all orderings of the organizations from the coalition C. Each ordering≺C can be associated
with a permutation of the set C, thus ‖LC‖ = ‖C‖!. For the ordering ≺C∈ LC we define ≺C (O(i)) =
{O(j) ∈ C : O(j) ≺C O
(i)} as the set of all organizations from C that precede O(i) in the order ≺C . The
Shapley value can be alternatively expressed [33] in the following form:
φ(u)(v(C)) =
1
‖C‖!
∑
≺C∈LC
(
v
(
≺C (O
(u)) ∪ {O(u)}
)
− v
(
≺C (O
(u)
))
. (2)
This formulation has an interesting interpretation. Consider the organizations joining the coalition C in the
order ≺C . Each organization O(u), when joining, contributes to the current coalition the value equal to(
v(≺C (O
(u)) ∪ {O(u)})− v(≺C (O
(u))
)
. Thus, φ(u)(v(C)) is the expected contribution to the coalition C,
when the expectation is taken over the order in which the organizations join C. Hereinafter we will call the
value φ(u)(v(C) (or using a shorter notation φ(u)) as the contribution of the organization O(u).
4The Shapley value has other interesting axiomatic characterizations [43].
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Let us consider a specific scheduling algorithm A, a specific time moment t, and a specific coalition
C. Ideally, the utilities of the organizations should be equal to the reference fair values, ∀u ψ(u)(C) =
φ(u)(v(C)), (meaning that the utility of the organization is equal to its contribution), but our scheduling
problem is discrete so an algorithm guaranteeing this property may not exist. Thus, we will call as fair an
algorithm that results in utilities close to contributions. The following definition of a fair algorithm is in two
ways recursive. A fair algorithm for a coalition C and time t must be also fair for all subcoalitions C′ ⊂ C
and for all previous t′ < t (an alternative to being fair for all previous t′ < t would be to ensure asymptotic
fairness; however, our formulation is more responsive and more relevant for the online case. We want to
avoid the case in which an organization is disfavored in one, possibly long, time period and then favored in
the next one).
Definition 3.1 Set an arbitrary metric ‖ · ‖d : 2k × 2k → R≥0; and set an arbitrary time moment t ∈ T. A
is a fair algorithm in t for coalition C in metric ‖ · ‖d if and only if:
A ∈ argminA′∈F(<t)‖~φ(A
′, C, t)− ~ψ(v(A′, C, t)‖d
where:
1. F(< t) is a set of algorithms fair in each point t′ < t; F(< 0) is a set of all greedy algorithms,
2. ~ψ(v(A′, C) is a vector of utilities 〈ψ(u)(v(A′, C))〉,
3. ~φ(A′, C) is a vector of contributions 〈φ(u)(v(A′, C))〉, where φ(u)(v(A′, C)) is given by Equation 2,
4. In Equation 2, for any C′ ⊂ C, v(C′) denotes v(Af , C′), where Af is any fair algorithm for coalition
C′.
Definition 3.2 A is a fair algorithm for coalition C if and only if it is fair in each time t ∈ T.
Further on, we consider algorithms fair in the Manhattan metric5: ‖~v1, ~v2‖M =
∑k
i=1 |v1[i]− v2[i]|.
Based on Definition 3.2 we construct a referral fair algorithm for an arbitrary utility function ψ (Algo-
rithm REF; the pseudo-code is presented in Figure 1). Algorithm REF keeps a schedule for every subcoali-
tion C′ ⊂ C. For each time moment the algorithm complements the schedule starting from the subcoalitions
of the smallest size. The values of all smaller coalitions v[Cs] are used to update the contributions of the
organizations (lines 4-4) in the procedure UpdateVals). Before scheduling any job of the coalition C′ the
contribution and the utility of each organization in C′ is updated (procedure UpdateVals). If there is a free
machine and a set of jobs waiting for execution, the algorithm selects the job according to Definition 3.1,
thus it selects the organization that minimizes the distance of the utilities ~ψ to their ideal values ~φ (proce-
dure SelectAndSchedule). Assuming the first job of the organization O(u) is tentatively scheduled, the
procedure Distance computes a distance between the new values of ~ψ and ~φ.
The procedure Distance works as follows. Assuming O(u) is selected the value ∆ψ denotes the
increase of the utility of O(u) thanks to scheduling its first waiting job. This is also the increase of the value
of the whole coalition. When procedure Distance(C, O(u), t) is executed, the schedules (and thus, the
values) in time t for all subcoalitions C′ ⊂ C are known. The schedule, for coalition C is known only in time
(t−1), as we have not yet decided which job should be scheduled in t. Thus, scheduling the job will change
the schedule (and the value) only for a coalition C. From the definition of the Shapley value it follows that
if the value v(C) of the coalition C increases by ∆ψ and the value of all subcoalitions remains the same,
then the contribution φ(u′) of each organization O(u′) ∈ C to C will increase by the same value equal to
∆ψ/‖C‖. Thus, for each organization O(u′) ∈ C the new contribution of O(u′) is (φ[C][O(u′)] + ∆ψ‖C‖ ). The
5Our analysis can be generalized to other distance functions.
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Notation:
jobs[C][O(u)] — list of waiting jobs of organization O(u).
φ[C][O(u)] — the contribution of O(u) in C, φ(u)(C).
ψ[C][O(u)] — utility of O(u) from being in C, ψ(C, O(u)).
v[C] — value of a coalition C.
σ[C] — schedule for a coalition C.
FreeMachine(σ, t) — returns true if and only if there is a free machine in σ in time t.
ReleaseJob(O(u), J):
for C : O(u) ∈ C do
jobs[C][O(u)].push(J)
Distance(C, O(u), t):
old← σ[C];
new ← σ[C] ∪ {(jobs[C][O(u)].first, t)};
∆ψ ← ψ(new,O(u), t)− ψ(old,O(u), t);
return
∣∣∣φ[C][O(u)] + ∆ψ‖C‖ − ψ[C][O(u)]−∆ψ
∣∣∣
+
∑
O(u
′)
∣∣∣φ[C][O(u′)] + ∆ψ‖C‖ − ψ[C][O(u
′)]
∣∣∣;
SelectAndSchedule(C, t):
u← argminO(u)(Distance(C, O
(u), t)) ;
σ[C]← σ[C] ∪ {(jobs[C][u].first, t)};
ψ[C][O(u)]← ψ(σ[C],O(u), t);
UpdateVals(C, t):
foreach O(u) ∈ C do
ψ[C][O(u)] ← ψ(σ[C], O(u), t);
φ[C][O(u)] ← 0;
v[C]←
∑
O(u)
ψ(σ[C],O(u), t);
foreach Csub: Csub ⊆ C do
foreach O(u) ∈ Csub do
φ[C][O(u)] ← φ[C][O(u)]+
(v[Csub]− v[Csub \ {O
(u)}])
· (‖Csub‖−1)!(‖C‖−‖Csub‖)!‖C‖! ;
FairAlgorithm(C):
foreach time moment t do
foreach job J(u)i : r(u)i = t do
ReleaseJob(O(u)i , J
(u)
i );
for s← 1 to ‖C‖ do
foreach C′ ⊂ C, such that ‖C′‖ = s do
UpdateVals(C′, t);
while FreeMachine(σ[C′], t) do
SelectAndSchedule(C′, t);
v[C]←
∑
O(u)
ψ(σ[C],O(u), t);
Figure 1: Algorithm REF: a fair algorithm for arbitrary utility function ψ.
new utility for each organization O(u′) ∈ C, such that O(u′) 6= O(u) is equal to ψ[C][O(u′)]. The new utility
of the organization O(u) is equal to (ψ[C][O(u)]|+∆ψ).
Theorem 3.3 Algorithm REF from Figure 1 is a fair algorithm.
Proof. Algorithm REF is a straightforward implementation of Definition 3.2. ⊓⊔
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Proposition 3.4 In each time moment t the time complexity of Algorithm REF from Figure 1 is
O(‖O‖(2‖O‖
∑
m(u) + 3‖O‖)).
Proof. Once the contribution is calculated, each coalition in t may schedule at most
∑
m(u) jobs. The
time needed for selecting each such a job is proportional to the number of the organizations. Thus, we
get the ‖O‖2‖O‖
∑
m(u) part of the complexity. For calculating the contribution of the organization O(u)
to the coalition C the algorithm considers all subsets of C – there are 2‖C‖ such subsets. Since there are(‖O‖
k
)
coalitions of size k, the number of the operations required for calculating the contributions of all
organizations is proportional to:
∑
(u)
‖O‖∑
k=0
(
‖O‖
k
)
2k = ‖O‖
‖O‖∑
k=0
(
‖O‖
k
)
1‖O‖−k2k = ‖O‖(1 + 2)‖O‖ = ‖O‖3‖O‖.
This gives the ‖O‖3‖O‖ part of the complexity and completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Corollary 3.5 The problem of finding fair schedule parameterized with the number of organizations is FPT.
4 Strategy-proof utility functions
There are many utility functions considered in scheduling, e.g. flow time, turnaround time, resource uti-
lization, makespan, tardiness. However, it is not sufficient to design a fair algorithm for an arbitrary utility
function ψ. Some functions may create incentive for organizations to manipulate their workload: to divide
the tasks into smaller pieces, to merge or to delay them. This is undesired as an organization should not
profit nor suffer from the way it presents its workload. An organization should present their jobs in the most
convenient way; it should not focus on playing against other organizations. We show that in organizationally
distributed systems, as we have to take into account such manipulations, the choice of the utility functions
is restricted.
For the sake of this section we introduce additional notation: let us fix an arbitrary organization O(u)
and let σt denote a schedule of the jobs of O(u) in time t. The jobs Ji(si, pi) of O(u) are characterized by
their start times si and processing times pi. We are considering envy-free utility functions that for a given
organization O(u) depend only on the schedule of the jobs of O(u). This means that there is no external
economical relation between the organization (the organization Ou cares about Ov only if the jobs of Ov
influence the jobs of Ou – in contrast to looking directly at the utility of Ov). We also assume the non-
clairvoyant model – the utility in time t depends only on the jobs or the parts of the jobs completed before
or at t. Let us assume that our goal is to maximize the utility function6. We start from presenting the desired
properties of the utility function ψ (when presenting the properties we use the shorter notation ψ(σt) for
ψ(σt, t)):
1. Tasks anonymity (starting times) — improving the completion time of a single task with a certain
processing time p by one unit of time is for each task equally profitable – for s, s′ ≤ t−1, we require:
ψ(σt ∪ {(s, p)}) − ψ(σt ∪ {(s+ 1, p)}) = ψ(σ
′
t ∪ {(s
′, p)}) − ψ(σ′t ∪ {(s
′ + 1, p)}) > 0.
2. Tasks anonymity (number of tasks) — in each schedule increasing the number of completed tasks is
equally profitable – for s ≤ t− 1, we require:
ψ(σt ∪ {(s, p)}) − ψ(σt) = ψ(σ
′
t ∪ {(s, p)}) − ψ(σ
′
t) > 0.
6We can easily transform the problem to the minimization form by taking the inverse of the standard maximization utility
function
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3. Strategy-resistance — the organization cannot profit from merging multiple smaller jobs into one
larger job or from dividing a larger job into smaller pieces:
ψ(σt ∪ {(s, p1)}) + ψ(σt ∪ {(s+ p1, p2)}) = ψ(σt ∪ {(s, p1 + p2)}).
In spite of dividing and merging the jobs, each organization can delay the release time of their jobs
and artificially increase the size of the jobs. Delaying the jobs is however never profitable for the
organization (by property 1). Also, the strategy-resistance property discourages the organizations to
increase the sizes of their jobs (the utility coming from processing a larger job is always greater).
To within a multiplicative and additive constants, there is only one utility function satisfying the afore-
mentioned properties.
Theorem 4.1 Let ψ be a utility function that satisfies the 3 properties: task anonymity (starting times); task
anonymity (number of tasks); strategy-resistance. ψ is of the following form:
ψ(σ, t) =
∑
(s,p)∈σt
min(p, t− s)(K1 −K2
s+min(s+ p− 1, t− 1)
2
) +K3,
where
1. K1 = ψ(σ ∪ {(0, 1)}, t) − ψ(σ) > 0
2. K2 = ψ(σ ∪ {(s, p)}, t) − ψ(σ ∪ {(s + 1, p)}, t) > 0
3. K3 = ψ(∅).
Proof.
ψ(σ, t) = ψ(
⋃
(s,p)∈σ
(s, p), t) = ψ(
⋃
(s,p)∈σ
(s,min(p, t− s)), t)
(non-clairvoyance)
= ψ(
⋃
(s,p)∈σ
min(s+p−1,t−1)⋃
i=s
(i, 1), t)
(strategy-resistance)
= ψ(
⋃
(s,p)∈σ
min(s+p−1,t−1)⋃
i=s
(0, 1), t) −K2
∑
(s,p)∈σt
min(s+p−1,t−1)∑
i=s
i
(starting times anonymity)
= ψ(∅) +
∑
(s,p)∈σt
min(s+p−1,t−1)∑
i=s
K1
(number of tasks anonymity)
−K2
∑
(s,p)∈σt
min(p, t− s)
s+min(s + p− 1, t− 1)
2
(sum of the arithmetic progression)
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= K3 +
∑
(s,p)∈σt
min(p, t− s)(K1 −K2
s+min(s+ p− 1, t− 1)
2
)
⊓⊔
We set the constants K1,K2,K3 so that to simplify the form of the utility function and ensure that the
utility is always positive. With K1 = 1, K2 = t and K3 = 0, we get the following strategy-proof utility
function:
ψsp(σ, t) =
∑
(s,p)∈σ:s≤t
min(p, t− s)
(
t−
s+min(s+ p− 1, t− 1)
2
)
. (3)
ψsp can be interpreted as the task throughput. A task with processing time pi can be identified with
pi unit-sized tasks starting in consecutive time moments. Intuitively, the function ψsp assigns to each such
unit-sized task starting at time ts a utility value equal to (t − ts); the higher the utility value, the earlier
this unit-sized task completes. A utility of the schedule is the sum of the utilities over all such unit-sized
tasks. ψsp is similar to the flow time except for two differences: (i) Flow time is a minimization objective,
but increasing the number of completed jobs increases its value. E.g., scheduling no jobs results in zero
(optimal) flow time, but of course an empty schedule cannot be considered optimal (breaking the second
axiom); (ii) Flow time favors short tasks, which is an incentive for dividing tasks into smaller pieces (this
breaks strategy-resistance axiom). The differences between the flow time and ψsp is also presented on
example in Figure 2. The similarity of ψsp to the flow time is quantified by Proposition 4.2 below.
Proposition 4.2 Let J be a fixed set of jobs, each having the same processing time p and each completed
before t. Then, maximization of the ψsp utility is equivalent to minimization of the flow time of the jobs.
Proof. Let σ denote an arbitrary schedule of J . Since the flow time uses the release times of the jobs, we
will identify the jobs with the triples (s, p, r) where s, p and r denote the start time, processing time and
release time, respectively. Let ψft(σ) denote the total flow time of the jobs from J in schedule σ. We have:
ψsp(σ, t) =
∑
(s,p,r)∈σ:s≤t
min(p, t− s)
(
t−
s+min(s+ p− 1, t− 1)
2
)
=
∑
(s,p,r)∈σ
p
(
t−
2s + p− 1
2
)
(each job is completed before t)
=
∑
(s,p,r)∈σ
(pt+
p2 + p
2
− r)− p
∑
(s,p,r)∈σ
((p+ s)− r)
= ‖J ‖(pt+
p2 + p
2
)−
∑
(s,p,r)∈σ
(r)− pψft(σ)
Since p, ‖J ‖(pt+ p
2+p
2 ) and
∑
(s,p,r)∈σ r are constants we get the thesis. ⊓⊔
5 Fair scheduling with strategy-proof utility
For the concrete utility function ψsp we can simplify the SelectAndSchedule function in Algorithm REF.
The simplified version is presented in Figure 3.
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J7, p7 = 3
J1p1 = 3
J2, p2 = 4
J3, p3 = 3
J4, p4 = 6
J6, p6 = 6
J5, p5 = 3
J8, p8 = 3
J9, p9 = 4
M1
M2
M3
t
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
J
(2)
1 , p
(2)
1 = 5
Figure 2: Consider 9 jobs owned by O(1) and a single job owned by O(2), all scheduled on 3 processors. We
assume all jobs were released in time 0. In this example all jobs finish before or at time t = 14. The utility
ψsp of the organization O(1) in time 13 does not take into account the last uncompleted unit of the job J9,
thus it is equal to: 3 · (13− 0+22 )+4 · (13−
0+3
2 )+ · · ·+3 · (13−
9+11
2 )+3 · (13−
10+12
2 ) = 262. The utility
in time 14 takes into account all the parts of the jobs, thus it is equal to 3 · (14 − 0+22 ) + 4 · (14 − 0+32 ) +
· · ·+3 · (14− 9+112 )+4 · (14−
10+13
2 ) = 297. The flow time in time 14 is equal to 3+4+ · · ·+14 = 70. If
there was no job J (2)1 , then J9 would be started in time 9 instead of 10 and the utility ψsp in time 14 would
increase by 4 · (10+132 −
9+12
2 ) = 4 (the flow time would decrease by 1). If, for instance, J6 was started
one time unit later, then the utility of the schedule would decrease by 6 (the flow time would decrease by
1), which shows that the utility takes into account the sizes of the jobs (in contrast to the flow time). If
the job J9 was not scheduled at all, the utility ψsp would decrease by 10, which shows that the schedule
with more tasks has higher (more optimal) utility (the flow time would decrease by 14; since flow time is a
minimization metric, this breaks the second axiom regarding the tasks anonymity).
: SelectAndSchedule
u← argminO(u)(ψ[C][O
(u)]− φ[C][O(u)]) ;
σ[C]← σ[C] ∪ {(jobs[C][u].first, t)};
ψ[C][O(u)]← ψ(σ[C],O(u), t);
Figure 3: Function SelectAndSchedule for utility function ψsp.
The algorithm selects the organization O(u) that has the largest difference (φ(u) − ψ(u)) that is the
organization that has the largest contribution in comparison to the obtained utility. One can wonder whether
we can select the organization in polynomial time – without keeping the 2‖C‖ schedules for all subcoalitions.
Unfortunately, the problem of calculating the credits for a given organization is NP-hard.
Theorem 5.1 The problem of calculating the contribution φ(u)(C, t) for a given organization O(u) in coali-
tion C in time t is NP-hard.
Proof. We present the reduction of the SUBSETSUM problem (which is NP-hard) to the problem of calcu-
lating the contribution for an organization. Let I be an instance of the SUBSETSUM problem. In I we are
given a set of k integers S = {x1, x2, . . . , xk} and a value x. We ask whether there exists a subset of S
with the sum of elements equal to x. From I we construct an instance Icon of the problem of calculating the
contribution for a given organization. Intuitively, we construct the set of (‖S‖ + 2) organizations: ‖S‖ of
them will correspond to the appropriate elements from S. The two dummy organizations a and b are used
for our reduction. One dummy organization a has no jobs. The second dummy organization b has a large
job that dominates the value of the whole schedule. The instance Icon is constructed in such a way that for
each coalition C such that b ∈ C and such that the elements of S corresponding to the organizations from
C sum up to the value lower than x, the marginal contribution of a to C is L + O(L), where O(L) is small
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in comparison with L. The marginal contribution of a to other coalitions is small (O(L)). Thus, from the
contribution of a, we can count the subsets of S with the sum of the elements lower than x. By repeating
this procedure for (x + 1) we can count the subsets of S with the sum of the elements lower than (x + 1).
By comparing the two values, we can find whether there exists the subset of S with the sum of the elements
equal to x. The precise construction is described below.
Let S<x = {S′ ⊂ S :
∑
xi∈S′
si < x} be the set of the subsets of S, each having the sum of the
elements lower than x. Let n<x(S) =
∑
S′∈S<x
(‖S′‖ + 1)!(‖S‖ − ‖S′‖)! be the number of the orderings
(permutations) of the set S ∪ {a, b} that starts with some permutation of the sum of exactly one element
of S<x (which is some subset of S such that the sum of the elements of this subset is lower than x) and
{b} followed by the element a. In other words, if we associate the elements from S ∪ {a, b} with the
organizations and each ordering of the elements of S ∪{a, b} with the order of the organizations joining the
grand coalition, then n<x(S) is the number of the orderings corresponding to the cases when organization
a joins grand coalition just after all the organizations from S′ ∪ {b}, where S′ is some element of S<x. Of
course S<x ⊆ S<(x+1). Note that there exists S′ ⊂ S, such that
∑
xi∈S′
xi = x if and only if the set S<x is a
proper subset of S<(x+1) (i.e. S<x ⊂ S<(x+1)). Indeed, there exists S′ such that S′ /∈ S<x and S′ ∈ S<(x+1)
if and only if
∑
xi∈S′
xi < x + 1 and
∑
xi∈S′
xi ≥ x from which it follows that
∑
xi∈S′
xi = x. Also,
S<x ⊂ S<(x+1) if and only if n<(x+1)(S) is greater than n<(x)(S) (we are doing a summation of the positive
values over the larger set).
In Icon there is a set of (k + 2) machines, each owned by a different organization. We will denote the
set of first k organizations as OS , the (k+1)-th organization as a and the (k+2)-th organization as b. Let
xtot =
∑k
j=1 xj + 2. The i-th organization from OS has 4 jobs: J (i)1 , J (i)2 , J (i)3 and J (i)4 , with release times
r
(i)
1 = r
(i)
1 = 0, r
(i)
3 = 3 and r
(i)
4 = 4; and processing times p
(i)
1 = p
(i)
2 = 1, p
(i)
3 = 2xtot and p
(i)
4 = 2xi.
The organization a has no jobs; the organization b has two jobs J (b)1 and J (b)2 , with release times r(b)1 = 2 and
r
(b)
2 = (2x+ 3); and processing times p
(b)
1 = (2x+ 2) and p
(b)
2 = L = 4‖S‖x
2
tot((k + 2)!) + 1 (intuitively
L is a large number).
Until time t = 2 only the organizations from OS have some (unit-size) jobs to be executed. The
organization b has no jobs till time t = 2, so it will run one or two unit-size jobs of the other organizations,
contributing to all such coalitions that include b and some other organizations from OS . This construction
allows to enforce that in the first time moment after t = 2 when there are jobs of some of the organizations
from OS and of b available for execution, the job of b will be selected and scheduled first.
Let us consider a contribution of a to the coalition C such that a /∈ C and b ∈ C. There are (‖C∩OS‖+2)
machines in the coalition C ∪ {a}. The schedule in C ∪ {a} after t = 2 looks in the following way (this
schedule is depicted in Figure 4). In time t = 2 one machine (let us denote this machine as M ′) starts the job
J
(b)
1 In time t = 3 some ‖C ∩OS‖ machines start the third jobs (the one with size 2xtot) of the organizations
from C ∩ O and one machine (denoted as M ′′) starts the fourth jobs of the organizations from C ∩ OS ;
the machine M ′′ completes processing all these jobs in time 2y + 4, where y = ∑i:O(i)∈C∧O(i)∈OS xi (of
course 2y + 4 ≤ 2xtot). In time (2x + 3), if y < x the machine M ′′ starts processing the large job J (b)2
of the organization b; otherwise machine M ′′ in time (2x + 3) still executes some job J (i)4 (as the jobs J (i)4
processed on M ′′ start in even time moments). In time 2x + 4, if y ≥ x, the large job J (b)2 is started by
machine M ′ just after the job J (b)1 is completed, (J (b)1 completes in (2x+4)); here we use the fact that after
t = 2, b will be prioritized over the organizations from OS . To sum up: if y < x then the large job J (b)2 is
started in time (2x+ 3), otherwise it is started in time (2x+ 4).
If y < x then by considering only a decrease of the starting time of the largest job, the contribution of a
to the coalition C can be lower bounded by c1:
c1 = L
(
t−
(2x+ 3) + (2x+ 3 + L)
2
)
− L
(
t−
(2x+ 4) + (2x+ 4 + L))
2
)
= L,
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Figure 4: The schedules for the coalition C ∪ {a} for two cases: a) ∑i:O(i)∈C∧O(i)∈OS xi ≤ x,
b)∑i:O(i)∈C∧O(i)∈OS xi > x. The two cases a) and b) differ only in the schedules on machines M ′ and M ′′.
In the case a) the large job J (b)2 (marked as a light gray) is started one time unit earlier than in case b).
The organization a causes also a decrease of the starting times of the small jobs (the jobs of the organizations
from OS); each job of size smaller or equal to 2xtot. The starting time of each such small job is decreased
by at most 2xtot time units. Thus, the contribution of a in case y < x can be upper bounded by c2:
c2 ≤ L+ 4‖S‖x
2
tot.
If y ≥ x then a causes only a decrease of the starting times of the small jobs of the organizations from
OS , so the contribution of a to C in this case can be upper bounded by c3:
c3 ≤ 4‖S‖x
2
tot.
By similar reasoning we can see that the contribution of a to any coalition C′ such that b /∈ C′ is also upper
bounded by 4‖S‖x2tot.
The contribution of organization a, φ(a), is given by Equation 2, with u = a and C = {O(1) . . . O(k+2)}.
Thus:
φ(a) =
∑
C′⊆C\{a}
‖C′‖!(k + 1− ‖C′‖)!
(k + 2)!
marg φ(C′, a),
where marg φ(C′, a) is the contribution of a to coalition C′. All the coalitions C′ such that a /∈ C′, b ∈ C′
and
∑
i:O(i)∈C′∩OS
xi < x will contribute to φ(a) the value at least equal to n<x(S)(k+2)! c1 =
n<x(S)L
2(k+2)! (as there
is exactly n<x(S) orderings corresponding to the the case when a is joining such coalitions C′) and at most
equal to n<x(S)(k+2)! c2 ≤
n<x(S)(L+8‖S‖x2tot)
2(k+2)! . The other (k + 2)! − n<x(S) orderings will contribute to φ
(a) the
value at most equal to ((k+2)!−n<x(S))(k+2)! c3 =
((k+2)!−n<x(S))(4‖S‖x2tot)
(k+2)! . Also:
((k + 2)!− n<x(S))(4‖S‖x
2
tot)
(k + 2)!
+
n<x(S)(4‖S‖x
2
tot)
(k + 2)!
= 4‖S‖x2tot <
L
(k + 2)!
,
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which means that φ(a) can be stated as φ(a) = n<x(S)L(k+2)! + R, where 0 ≤ R ≤
L
(k+2)! . We conclude that
⌊ (k+2)!φ
(a)
L ⌋ = n<x(S). We have shown that calculating the value of φ
(a) allows us to find the value n<x(S).
Analogously, we can find n<(x+1)(S). By comparing n<x(S) with n<(x+1)(S) we find the answer to the
initial SUBSETSUM problem, which completes the proof.
⊓⊔
We propose the following definition of the approximation of the fair schedule (similar definitions of the
approximation ratio are used for multi-criteria optimization problems [7]):
Definition 5.2 Let σ be a schedule and let ~ψ be a vector of the utilities of the organizations in σ. We say
that σ is an α-approximation fair schedule in time t if and only if there exists a truly fair schedule σ∗, with
the vector ~ψ∗ = 〈ψ(u),∗〉 of the utilities of the organizations, such that:
‖~ψ − ~ψ∗‖M ≤ α‖~ψ
∗‖M = α
∑
u
ψ(u),∗ = α · v(σ∗, C).
Unfortunately, the problem of finding the fair schedule is difficult to approximate. There is no algorithm
better than 1/2 (the proof below). This means that the problem is practically inapproximable. Consider two
schedules of jobs of m organizations on a single machine. Each organization has one job; all the jobs are
identical. In the first schedule σord the jobs are scheduled in order: J (1)1 , J (2)1 , . . . J (m)1 and in the second
schedule σrev the jobs are scheduled in exactly reverse order: J (m)1 , J (m−1)1 , . . . J (1)1 . The relative distance
between σord and σrev tends to 1 (with increasing m), so (12)-approximation algorithm does not allow to
decide whether σord is truly better than σrev. In other words, 12)-approximation algorithm cannot distinguish
whether a given order of the priorities of the organizations is more fair then the reverse order.
Theorem 5.3 For every ǫ > 0, there is no polynomial algorithm for finding the (12 − ǫ)-approximation fair
schedule, unless P = NP.
Proof. Intuitively, we divide time in (‖B‖2 + 3) independent batches. The jobs in the last batch are
significantly larger than all the previous ones. We construct the jobs in all first (‖B‖2 + 2) batches so that
the order of execution of the jobs in the last batch depends on whether there exists a subset S′ ⊂ S such that∑
xi∈S′
xi = x. If the subset does not exist the organizations are prioritized in some predefined order σord;
otherwise, the order is reversed σrev. The sizes of the jobs in the last batch are so large that they dominate
the values of the utilities of the organizations. The relative distance between the utilities in σord and in σrev
is (1 − ǫ) so any (12 − ǫ)-approximation algorithm A would allow to infer the true fair schedule for such
constructed instance, and so the answer to the initial SUBSETSUM problem. The precise construction is
described below.
We show that if there is an (12 − ǫ)-approximation algorithm A for calculating the vector of the contri-
butions, then we would be able to use A for solving the SUBSETSUM problem (which is NP-hard). This
proof is similar in a spirit to the proof of Theorem 5.1. Let I be an instance of the SUBSETSUM problem,
in which we are given a set S = {x1, x2, . . . , xk} of k integers and a value x. In the SUBSETSUM problem
we ask for the existence of a subset S′ ⊂ S such that
∑
xi∈S′
xi = x; we will call the subsets S′ ⊂ S such
that
∑
xi∈S′
xi = x the x-sum subsets.
From I we construct the instance of the problem of calculating the vector of contributions in the fol-
lowing way. We set O = OS ∪ {a} ∪ B to be the set of all organizations where OS = {O1, . . . , Ok}
(‖OS‖ = k) is the set of the organizations corresponding to the appropriate elements of S and {a} ∪ B,
where B = {B1, . . . , Bℓ} (ℓ = ‖B‖ will be defined afterwards; intuitively ℓ ≫ k), is the set of dummy
organizations needed for our construction.
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We divide the time into (‖B‖2+3) independent batches. The batches are constructed in such a way that
the (j + 1)-th batch starts after the time in which all the jobs released in j-th batch are completed in every
coalition (thus, the duration of the batch can be just the maximum release time plus the sum of the processing
times of the jobs released in this batch). As the result, the contribution φ(u) of each organization O(u) is
the sum of its contributions in the all (‖B‖2 + 3) batches. For the sake of the clarity of the presentation we
assume that time moments in each batch are counted from 0.
We start from the following observation: if the sum of the processing times of the jobs in a batch is equal
to psum, then the contribution of each organization can be upper bounded by p2sum. This observation follows
from the fact that any organization, when joining a coalition, cannot decrease the completion time of any job
by more than psum. As the total number of unit-size parts of the jobs is also psum, we infer that the joining
organization cannot increase the value of the coalition by more than p2sum. The second observation is the
following: if the joining organization causes decrease of the completion time of the task with processing
time p, then its contribution is at least equal to p‖O‖! (as it must decrease the start time of the job by at least
one time unit in at least one coalition).
Let xtot =
∑k
j=1 xj . In our construction we use 4 large numbers L,XL,H and XH , where L =
(‖O‖+1+4‖B‖2x2tot) · ‖O‖!; XL = (O! ·L · ‖O‖(‖O‖+1))
2+O!4‖B‖2x2tot+1, H = ‖B‖
2(2‖O‖(1+
xtot) + 2x+XL)
2 +1 and XH is a very large number that will be defined afterwards. Intuitively: XH ≫
H ≫ XL≫ L≫ xtot.
In the first batch only the organizations from B release their jobs. The i-th organization from B releases
2i jobs in time 0, each of size L. This construction is used to ensure that after the first batch the i-th
organization from B has the difference (φ(i)−ψ(i)) greater than the difference (φ(i+1)−ψ(i+1)) of the (i+1)-
th organization from B of at least L‖O‖! = (‖O‖+1+4‖B‖
2x2tot) and of at most p2sum = (L ·
‖B‖(‖B‖+1)
2 )
2 <
XL
O! − 4‖B‖
2x2tot.
In the second batch, at time 0, all the organizations except for a release 2 jobs, each of size H . This
construction is used to ensure that after the second batch the contribution (and so the the difference (φ−ψ))
of the organization a is large (at least equal to H , as a joining any coalition causes the job of size H to be
scheduled at least one time unit earlier). Since in each of the next ‖B‖2 batches the total size of the released
jobs will be lower than (2‖O‖(1 + xtot) + 2x +XL), we know that in each of the next ‖B‖2 batches the
jobs of a will be prioritized over the jobs of the other organizations.
Each of the next ‖B‖2 batches is one of the 2‖B‖ different types. For the organization Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ ‖B‖)
there is exactly i batches of type Bch(Bi, 2x+1) and (‖B‖− i) batches of type Bch(Bi, 2x). The order of
these ‖B‖2 batches can be arbitrary.
The batches Bch(Bi, 2x) and Bch(Bi, 2x + 1) are similar. The only difference is in the jobs of the
organization a. In the batch Bch(Bi, 2x) the organization a has two jobs J (a)1 and J (a)2 , with release times
r
(a)
1 = 0 and r
(a)
2 = 2x and processing times p
(a)
1 = 2x+ 1 and p
(a)
2 = XL. In the batch Bch(Bi, 2x+ 1)
the organization a has two jobs J (a)1 and J (a)2 , with release times r(a)1 = 0 and r(a)2 = 2x+1 and processing
times p(a)1 = 2x+2 and p
(a)
2 = XL. All other organizations have the same jobs in batches Bch(Bi, 2x) and
Bch(Bi, 2x + 1). The organization Bi has no jobs and all the other organizations from B release a single
job of size (2xtot + 2) in time 0. The j-th organization from OS has two jobs J (j)1 and J (j)2 , with release
times r(j)1 = 0 and r
(j)
2 = 1 and processing times p
(j)
1 = 2xtot + 1 and p
(j)
2 = 2xj .
Finally, in the last (‖B‖2 + 3)-th batch only the organizations from B release their jobs. Each such
organization releases ‖O‖ jobs in time 0, each of size XH .
Now let us compare the schedules for the batches Bch(Bi, 2x) and Bch(Bi, 2x+1) (see Figure 5). Let
us consider a schedule for a coalition C′. Let OS,C′ = OS ∩ C′; let BC′ = B ∩ C′ \ {Bi}. Let J1 denote the
set of ‖OS,C′‖ jobs of sizes 2xtot+1 (these are the first jobs of the organizations from OS,C′). Let J2 denote
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Figure 5: The schedule for the coalition C′ such thatBi ∈ C′ and a ∈ C′ in batch Bch(Bi, 2x+1), for 3 cases:
a) ∑xi:Oi∈OS,C′ xi > x, b) ∑xi:Oi∈OS,C′ xi < x, c) ∑xi:Oi∈OS,C′ xi = x. We compare Bi’s contribution
φ on this schedule to schedule Bch(Bi, 2x) (not shown; the only differences are that p(a)1 = 2x + 1 and
r
(a)
2 = 2x). Other organizations Bj 6= Bi have utility equal to contribution in all cases considered here. As
Bi has no jobs, it contributes only a single machine (corresponding to M ′). Thanks to M ′, the small jobs
J
(i)
2 execute at most 2xtot earlier (if there is no machine M ′, these jobs are executed at M). The total size
of these small jobs is 2xtot. Regarding small jobs, the resulting contribution of Bi to C′ is bounded by 4x2tot.
In case a) M ′ does not decrease the start time of the large job J (a)2 ; the same happens in batch Bch(Bi,
2x). In case b) M ′ speeds up J (a)2 by 1; the same happens in batch Bch(Bi, 2x). In case c) M ′ also speeds
up J (a)2 by 1; however, in batch Bch(Bi, 2x) M ′ does not decrease J (a)2 ’s start time (J (a)2 is always started
at (2x+1)). To summarize, Bi contribution to C′ in both a) and b) differs by at most 4x2tot between Bch(Bi,
2x) and Bch(Bi, 2x + 1). In contrast, in c) the contribution in Bch(Bi, 2x + 1) is greater by at least
XL− 4x2tot compared to the contribution in Bch(Bi, 2x).
As a consequence, considering Bi’s contribution to all coalitions, if there exists an x-sum subset
S′ ⊂ S (case c), then the contribution of Bi in Bch(Bi, 2x + 1) is by at least XL‖O‖! − 4x2tot greater than in
Bch(Bi, 2x); if there is no such an x-sum subset, then the contribution of Bi in Bch(Bi, 2x + 1) and in
Bch(Bi, 2x) differ by no more than 4x2tot.
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the set of ‖OS,C′‖ jobs of sizes from S (the second jobs of the organizations from OS,C′). Let J3 denote the
‖BC′‖ jobs of the organizations from BC′ of sizes 2xtot + 2 (the single jobs of these organizations).
If
∑
xi:Oi∈OS,C′
xi > x or
∑
xi:Oi∈OS,C′
xi < x the schedules for any C′ in batches Bch(Bi, 2x) and
Bch(Bi, 2x + 1) looks similarly. In time 0, ‖OS,C′‖ machines will schedule the ‖OS,C′‖ jobs from J1 (let
us denote these machines as M) and ‖BC′‖ machines will schedule the ‖BC′‖ jobs from J3. If Bi /∈ C′
then the jobs from J2 will be scheduled on the machines from M just after the jobs from J1. If Bi ∈ C′
and a /∈ C′, then the coalition C′ has (‖OS,C′‖ + ‖BC′‖ + 1) machines; one machine will execute the jobs
from J2. If Bi ∈ C′ and a ∈ C′ then the coalition C′ has (‖OS,C′‖ + ‖BC′‖ + 2) machines. One machine
(denoted as M ′) will execute the jobs from J2 and one other machine (denoted as M ′′) will execute the
job J (a)1 . Now, if
∑
xi:Oi∈OS,C′
xi < x then J (a)2 will be scheduled on M ′; otherwise on M ′′ (this follows
from the construction in the second batch – we recall that the jobs of a should be prioritized). Thus, as
explained in Figure 5, if
∑
xi:Oi∈OS,C′
xi > x or
∑
xi:Oi∈OS,C′
xi < x the contribution and the utility of
each organization from B in two batches Bch(Bi, 2x) and Bch(Bi, 2x+ 1) differ by at most 4x2tot.
If
∑
xi:Oi∈OS,C′
xi = x, then the schedules for the cases: (i) Bi /∈ C′ (ii) (Bi ∈ C′ and a /∈ C′) remain
the same as in case
∑
i:Oi∈OS,C′
xi 6= x. For the last case (Bi ∈ C′ and a ∈ C′) the jobs from J1, from J2
and J (a)1 are scheduled in the same way as previously. However, the job J (a)2 will be scheduled in Bch(Bi,
2x+ 1) on machine M ′ (in the moment it is released) and in Bch(Bi, 2x) on machine M ′ or M ′′ (one time
unit later than it was released). As explained in Figure 5, if there exists an x-sum subset S′ ⊂ S, then the
contribution of Bi in Bch(Bi, 2x+ 1) will be greater by at least of XLO! − 4x2tot than in Bch(Bi, 2x).
As the result, if there does not exist an x-sum subset S′ ⊂ S, then the difference (φ(i) − ψ(i)) for the
i-th organization from B will be greater than the difference (φ(i+1) − ψ(i+1)) for the (i+ 1)-th organization
from B by at least (‖O‖+1) (from the construction in the first batch the difference (φ(i)−ψ(i)) was greater
than (φ(i+1) − ψ(i+1)) by at least (‖O‖ + 1 + 4‖B‖2x2tot), and as explained in Figure 5 the difference
(φ(i+1) −ψ(i+1) − φ(i) +ψ(i)) could change by at most 4‖B‖2x2tot). Otherwise, the difference (φ(i) −ψ(i))
for the i-th organization will be lower than for the (i+ 1)-th organization (as there are more batches of type
Bch(Bi+1, 2x+ 1) than of type Bch(Bi, 2x+ 1)).
Thus, if there does not exist an x-sum subset S′ ⊂ S, then in the last batch the jobs of B1 will be
scheduled first, than the jobs of B2, and so on – let us denote such schedule as σord. On the other hand, if
there exists an x-sum subset S′ ⊂ S, the jobs in the last batch will be scheduled in the exactly reverse order
– such schedule will be denoted as σrev.
Now, let us assess the distance between the vector of utilities in case of two schedules σord and σrev.
Let us assume that ‖B‖ is even. Every job of the organization Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ ‖B‖2 ) in the last batch is
started XH(‖B‖ − 2i+ 1) time units earlier in σord than in σrev. The jobs of the organization B(‖B‖+1−i)
(1 ≤ i ≤ ‖B‖2 ) are scheduled XH(‖B‖ − 2i + 1) time units later in σord than in σrev. Since each such job
consists of XH unit-size elements, the distance between the vector of utilities for σord and σrev, denoted as
∆ψ, can be lower bounded by:
∆ψ ≥ 2‖O‖
‖B‖/2∑
i=1
(2i− 1)XH2 = ‖O‖‖B‖
(1 + 1 + 2‖B‖2 − 2)
2
XH2 =
1
2
‖O‖‖B‖2XH2.
Now, we can define XH to be the total size of the all except the last batch times 4ǫ . Below we show how
to bound the total utility ψtot of the true fair schedule (σord or σrev) in the time t when all the jobs are
completed. Each unit size part of the job completed in time t contributes to the utility the value 1. Each unit
size part of the job executed in time t− 1 is worth 2, and so on. Since the jobs in the last batch are executed
on ‖O‖ machines and the duration of the batch is equal to ‖B‖XH , the utility of the jobs from the last batch
is equal to
∑‖B‖XH
i=1 i. The jobs in all previous batches are started no earlier than in t− ‖B‖XH − ǫ4XH .
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The duration of the all but the last batch can be upper bounded by ǫ4XH . There are ‖O‖ machines, so the
utility of the jobs from the all but the last batch can be upper bounded by (‖B‖XH + ǫ4XH) ǫ4XH . Thus
we get the following bound on ψtot:
ψtot < ‖O‖

‖B‖XH∑
i=1
i+
(
‖B‖XH +
ǫ
4
XH )(
ǫ
4
XH
)
≤ ‖O‖
(
1 + ‖B‖XH
2
‖B‖XH +
ǫ
4
‖B‖XH2 +
ǫ
16
2
XH2
)
≤ ‖O‖
(
1
2
(1 + ‖B‖XH)2 +
ǫ
4
‖B‖2XH2
)
≤ ‖O‖‖B‖2XH2
(
1
2
·
(
1 + ‖B‖
‖B‖
)2
+
ǫ
4
)
.
We can chose the size ‖B‖ so that
(
1+‖B‖
‖B‖
)2
< 1 + ǫ2 . As the result we have:
∆ψ/ψtot >
1
2
/
1
2
((
1 + ‖B‖
‖B‖
)2
+
ǫ
2
)
>
1
1 + ǫ
> 1− ǫ
Finally let us assume that there exists (12 − ǫ)-approximation algorithm A that returns the schedule σ
for our instance. Now, if σ is closer to σord than to σrev, we can infer that σord is a true fair solution to our
instance (and so the answer to the initial SUBSETSUM question is “yes”). Otherwise, σrev is a true solution
(and the answer to the SUBSETSUM problem is “no”). This completes the proof.
⊓⊔
5.1 Special case: unit-size jobs
In case when the jobs are unit-size the problem has additional properties that allow us to construct an efficient
approximation (however, the complexity of this special case is open). However, the results in this section do
not generalize to related or unrelated processors. For unit-size jobs, the value of each coalition v(C) does
not depend on the schedule:
Proposition 5.4 For any two greedy algorithms A1 and A2, for each coalition C and each time moment t,
the values of the coalitions v(A1, C, t) and v(A2, C, t) are equal, provided all jobs are unit-size.
Proof. We prove the following stronger thesis: for every time moment t any two greedy algorithms A1 and
A2 schedule the same number of the jobs till t. We prove this thesis by induction. The base step for t = 0 is
trivial. Having the thesis proven for (t − 1) and, thus knowing that in t in both schedules there is the same
number of the jobs waiting for execution (here we use the fact that the jobs are unit-size), we infer that in t
the two algorithms schedule the same number of the jobs. Since the value of the coalition does not take into
account the owner of the job, we get the thesis for t. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
As the result, we can use the randomized approximation algorithm for the scheduling problem restricted
to unit-size jobs (Algorithm RAND from Figure 6). The algorithm is inspired by the randomized approxi-
mation algorithm for computing the Shapley value presented by Liben-Nowell et al [27]. However, in our
case, the game is not supermodular (which is shown in Proposition 5.5 below), and so we have to adapt the
algorithm and thus obtain different approximation bounds.
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Notation:
ǫ, λ — as in Theorem 5.6
Prepare(C):
N ← ⌈ ‖C‖
2
ǫ2
ln
(
‖C‖
1−λ
)
⌉;
Γ← generate N random orderings (permutations) of the set of all organizations (with replacement);
Subs← Subs′ ← ∅ ;
foreach ≺∈ Γ do
for u← 1 to ‖C‖ do
C′ ← {O(i) : O(i) ≺ O(u)} ;
Subs ← Subs ∪ {C′}; Subs′ ← Subs′ ∪ {C′ ∪ {O(u)}} ;
ReleaseJob(O(u), J):
for C′ ∈ Subs ∪ Subs′ : O(u) ∈ C′ do
jobs[C′][O(u)].push(J)
SelectAndSchedule(C, t):
u← argminO(u)(ψ[C][O
(u)]− φ[C][O(u)]) ;
σ[C]← σ[C] ∪ {(jobs[C][u].first, t)};
finPerOrg[O(u)] ← finPerOrg[O(u)] + 1;
φ[O(u)] ← φ[O(u)] + 1;
FairAlgorithm(C):
Prepare(C) ;
foreach time moment t do
foreach job J(u)i : r(u)i = t do
ReleaseJob(O(u)i , J
(u)
i );
foreach C′ ⊂ Subs ∪ Subs′ do
v[C′] ← v[C′] + finPerCoal[C′] ;
n← min(
∑
O(u)∈C′ m
(u), ‖jobs[C][O(u)]‖) ;
remove first n jobs from jobs[C][O(u)] ;
finPerCoal[C′] ← finPerCoal[C′] + n ;
v[C′] ← v[C′] + n ;
foreach O(u) ∈ C do
ψ[O(u)]← ψ[O(u)] + finPerOrg[O(u)];
φ[O(u)]← 0;
foreach C′ ∈ Subs : O(u) /∈ C′ do
marg φ← v[C′ ∪ {O(u)}]− v[C′] ;
φ[O(u)] ← φ[O(u)] + marg φ · 1
N
;
while FreeMachine(σ[C], t) do
SelectAndSchedule(C, t);
Figure 6: Algorithm RAND: a fair algorithm for the specific utility function ψsp and for unit-size jobs.
Proposition 5.5 In case of unit-size jobs the cooperation game in which the value of the coalition C is
defined by v(C) =∑O(u)∈C ψ(O(u)) is not supermodular.
Proof. Consider a following instance with 3 organizations: a, b and c each owning a single machine.
Organizations a and b in time t = 0 release two unit size jobs each; the organization c has no jobs. We are
considering the values of the coalitions in time t = 2; v({a, c}) = 4 (the two jobs are scheduled in time 0),
v({b, c}) = 4, v({a, b, c}) = 7 (three jobs are scheduled in time 0 and one in time 1) and v({c}) = 0 (there
is no job to be scheduled). We see that v({a, b, c}) + v({c}) < v({a, c}) + v({b, c}), which can be written
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as:
v({a, c} ∪ {b, c}) + v({a, c} ∩ {b, c}) < v({a, c}) + v({b, c}).
This shows that the game is not supermodular. ⊓⊔
In this algorithm we keep simplified schedules for a random subset of all possible coalitions. For each
organization O(u) the set Subs[O(u)] keeps N = ‖C‖
2
ǫ2 ln
(
‖C‖
1−λ
)
random coalitions not containing O(u); for
each such random coalition C′ which is kept in Subs[O(u)], Subs′[O(u)] contains the coalition C′ ∪ {O(u)}.
For the coalitions kept in Subs[O(u)] we store a simplified schedule (the schedule that is determined by
an arbitrary greedy algorithm). The simplified schedule allows us to find the value v(C′) of the coalition
C′. Maintaining the whole schedule would require the recursive information about the schedules in the
subcoalitions of C′. However, as the consequence of Proposition 5.4 we know that the value of the coalition
v(C′) can be determined by an arbitrary greedy algorithm7.
The third foreach loop in procedure FairAlgorithm (line 4 in Figure 6) updates the values of all
coalitions kept in Subs and Subs’. From Equation 3 it follows that after one time unit if no additional job is
scheduled, the value of the coalition increases by the number of completed unit-size parts of the jobs (here,
as the jobs are unit size, the number of the completed jobs is finPerCoal[C′]). In time moment t, all waiting
jobs (the number of such jobs is ‖jobs[C][O(u)]‖) are scheduled provided there are enough processors (the
number of the processors is
∑
O(u)∈C′ m
(u)). If n additional jobs are scheduled in time t then the value of
the coalition in time t increases by n.
In the fourth foreach loop (line 4 in Figure 6), once again we use the fact that the utility of the organi-
zation after one time unit increases by the number of finished jobs (finPerOrg[O(u)]). In the last foreach
loop (line 3) the contribution of the organization is approximated by summing the marginal contributions
marg φ only for the kept coalitions. Theorem 5.6 below gives the bounds for the quality of approximation.
Theorem 5.6 Let ~ψ denote the vector of utilities in the schedule determined by Algorithm RAND from
Figure 6. If the jobs are unit-size, then A with the probability λ determines the ǫ-approximation schedule,
i.e. gives guarantees for the bound on the distance to the truly fair solution:
‖~ψ − ~ψ∗‖M ≤ ǫ|~ψ
∗|.
Proof. Let us consider an organization O(u) participating in a coalition C and a time moment t. Let φ(u),∗
and ψ(u),∗ denote the contribution and the utility of the organization O(u) in a coalition C in time moment t
in a truly fair schedule. Let v∗(C) denote the value of the coalition C in a truly fair schedule. According to
notation in Figure 6, let φ[O(u)] and ψ[O(u)] denote the contribution and the utility of the organization O(u)
in a coalition C in time t in a schedule determined by Algorithm RAND; Let N = ‖C‖
2
ǫ2
ln
(
‖C‖
1−λ
)
. First, note
that |ψ(u),∗ − ψ[O(u)]| ≤ |φ(u),∗ − φ[O(u)]|. Indeed, if the contribution of the organization O(u) increases
by a given value ∆φ then Algorithm RAND will schedule ∆φ more unit-size jobs of the organization O(u)
provided there is enough such jobs waiting for execution.
Let X denote the random variable that with the probability 1‖C‖! returns the marginal contribution of
the organization O(u) to the coalition composed of the organizations preceding O(u) in the random order
(of course, there is ‖C‖! such random orderings). We know that X ∈ [0, v∗(C)] and that E(X) = φ(u),∗.
Algorithm RAND is constructed in such a way that φ[O(u)] =
∑N
i=0
1
NXi, where Xi are independent copies
7In this point we use the assumption about the unit size of the jobs. The algorithm cannot be extended to the general case. In
a general case, for calculating the value for each subcoalition we would require the exact schedule which cannot be determined
polynomially (Theorem 5.1).
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Figure 7: The example showing that greedy algorithms might induce suboptimal resource utilization. In the
example we have 4 jobs of the organization O(1), each of size 3, and 2 jobs of the organization O(2), each
of size 6. All the jobs are released in time 0. Let us consider time moment T = 6. In Figure (a) the jobs of
O(2) are started first, which results in 100% resource utilization. In Figure (b) the jobs of O(1) are started
first, which in time T gives 75% of resource utilization.
of X. Thus, E(φ[O(u)]) = φ(u),∗. From Hoeffding’s inequality we get the bound on the probability pǫ that
φ[O(u)]− φ(u),∗ > ǫ‖C‖v
∗(C):
pǫ = P
(
N∑
i=0
1
N
Xi − φ
(u),∗ >
ǫ
‖C‖
v∗(C)
)
< exp
(
−
ǫ2v∗(C)2N2
v∗(C)2N‖C‖2
)
= exp
(
−
ǫ2N
‖C‖2
)
=
1− λ
‖C‖
.
The probability that ~φ − ~φ∗ > ǫv∗(C) can be bounded by pǫ‖C‖ = 1 − λ. As the result, also the
probability that ~ψ − ~ψ∗ > ǫv∗(C) can be bounded by 1− λ, which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
The complexity of Algorithm RAND is ‖O‖ · N = ‖O‖‖C‖
2
ǫ2
ln
(
‖C‖
1−λ
)
times the complexity of the
single-organization scheduling algorithm. As a consequence, we get the following result:
Theorem 5.7 There exists an FPRAS for the problem of finding the fair schedule for the case when the jobs
are unit size.
6 Resource utilization of greedy algorithms
It might appear that in order to ensure the fairness of the algorithm we might be forced to use globally inef-
ficient algorithms. Such algorithms might, for instance, waste resources. We define the resource utilization
as the percentage of the time in which, on average, every processor is busy. The resource utilization is an
established metric indicating the global efficiency of resource usage. Indeed, even though we use greedy
algorithms, some of them might result in suboptimal resource utilization. This problem is shown in Figure 7.
Thus, there is a natural question, which in additional to the context of fair scheduling, is interesting on
its own. How bad can we be when using a greedy algorithm (with any underlying scheduling policy)? In
the next theorem we show that the example from Figure 7 is, essentially, the worst possible scenario.
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Figure 8: The figure illustrating the notation used in the proof of Theorem 6.2. There are 3 time blocks in
this figure: the first one lasts from t1 till t2; the second from t2 till t3; and the third one from t3 till T . The
parts of jobs that were delayed outside their time block (in comparison with an optimal schedule) are marked
in dark gray. The remaining parts of these jobs are marked in light gray. We see that these jobs which are
delayed outside the i-th time block are started at or before t′i.
Definition 6.1 An algorithm A is an α-competitive online algorithm for resource utilization if and only if in
each time moment T the ratio of the resource utilization between the schedule derived byA and the schedule
obtained by any other algorithm is greater or equal to α.
Theorem 6.2 Every greedy algorithm for scheduling sequential jobs on identical processors is a 34 -competitive
online algorithm for resource utilization.
Proof. Let σ denote the schedule obtained by some greedy algorithm A until time T , and let σ∗ denote the
schedule obtained by the optimal (according to the resource utilization metric) algorithm for the same input.
Now, we will divide the time axis into blocks in the following way. The first block starts in time 0. The i-th
block (i > 1) starts in the earliest possible time moment ti such that (i) ti > ti−1 (the i-th block starts after
the (i− 1)-th one), and (ii) in ti there are jobs in σ running on all the processors and in (ti − 1) at least one
processor in σ is idle. Let tℓ denote the start time of the last block. By convention we take tℓ+1 = T . The
blocks for the example schedule are depicted in Figure 8. Furthermore, let t′i denote the earliest moment in
the i-th time block in which some processor is idle. Let hi = ti+1 − ti denote the duration of the i-th time
block. Let hi,1 = t′i − ti and let hi,2 = ti+1 − t′i.
In our proof we will consider the time blocks separately and for each time block we will prove that the
total number of the unit-size parts of the jobs completed in this block in schedules σ and σ∗ vary by no
more than the factor of 34 . Throughout this proof we will use the variable V that, intuitively, accumulates
the number of unit-size parts of the jobs that in σ were completed in the earlier time block than in σ∗. Let
Vi denote the value of V after we completed an analysis for the i-th block, with V0 = 0.
Let us consider the i-th time block. Let xi and x∗i denote the number of unit-size parts of the jobs
completed in the i-th time block in schedules σ and σ∗, respectively. If xi ≥ x∗i then we increase the
variable V by (xi − x∗i ). Otherwise, let ∆xi = x∗i − xi > 0. We consider the two following cases:
1. If Vi−1 = 0, then we set ∆yi = ∆xi, and Vi = 0.
2. If Vi−1 > 0, then we set ∆yi = ∆xi−min(∆xi, Vi−1), and Vi = Vi−1−min(∆xi, Vi−1). Intuitively,
this means that the unit-size parts of jobs that were computed extra in earlier blocks and accumulated
in V , pay for some parts of the jobs that were computed in the later block.
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Now, if ∆yi = 0 this means that from V we managed to pay for the parts that, due to inefficiency of the
algorithm A, were not computed in the i-th time block. Otherwise (∆yi > 0), we infer that some ∆yi > 0
parts of the jobs that were released before ti+1 were delayed and in σ were not completed in the i-th time
block (while they were in σ∗). These jobs were released at or after ti. Indeed, otherwise the job would be
started at time ti − 1 or earlier (the algorithm A is greedy, and a processor is idle at ti − 1), and so, such
a job would be processed for the whole duration of the i-th time block. Consequently, the unit-size parts
of this job would not contribute to ∆yi (the number of unit-size parts of this job completed in the i-th time
block in σ would be no greater than in σ∗).
Let us consider the jobs the parts of which contributed to ∆yi. Let m′i denote the number of machines
on which these jobs were processed (see Figure 8 for an example). From the pigeonhole principle, at least
one from the considered jobs, J , was delayed by at least ∆yi
m′i
. Since the algorithm A is greedy, hi,1 ≥ ∆yim′i
(there were at least ∆yim′i time moments in the i-th time block with no idle processors; otherwise J would be
started earlier). Also, each from the considered jobs starts in time t′i at the latest—indeed, if it would be
started later, then from the greediness of the algorithm we would infer that the release time of such job is at
least t′i + 1, and so, such job would not be delayed in σ. Consequently, through the whole duration of the
i-th block some m′i machines are continuously occupied. Thus, the idle surface of the processors in σ is at
most equal to hi,2(m−m′i). Since, ∆yi ≤ ∆xi, and ∆xi denotes the difference in the number of unit-size
parts of the jobs computed in σ∗ and in σ, we infer that ∆yi ≤ hi,2(m−m′i).
Now, let us estimate oi, the number of the occupied slots in the i-th block in schedule σ.
oi ≥ hi,1m+ hi,2m
′
i ≥
∆yi
m′i
m+
∆yi
m−m′i
m′i ≥ ∆yi
(
m
m′i
+
m′i
m−m′i
)
≥ 3∆yi.
Thus: oioi+∆yi ≥
oi
oi+
1
3
oi
= 34 . Since our reasoning can be repeated for every time block, we get the thesis.
⊓⊔
This result shows that even without any information on jobs’ release dates, durations even with an
arbitrary scheduling policy, we waste no more than 25% of resources. Of course, this loss of efficiency is
even smaller when there are many jobs to be computed. For instance, if in any time moment there are jobs
waiting for execution, any greedy algorithm achieves 100% resource utilization.
It is also natural to consider the loss of efficiency according to our strategy-proof metric. We have chosen
to consider resource utilization as it has more intuitive meaning in terms of waste of resources. We leave the
problem of finding bounds for our strategy-proof metric as a natural follow-up question.
We note that our fair scheduling algorithm is also applicable for parallel jobs (jobs requiring more than
one processor). However, for the case of parallel jobs the loss of the global efficiency of an arbitrary greedy
algorithm can be higher. We leave these extensions, as well as generalization of the processor model to
related and unrelated machines, for the future work.
7 Experimental evaluation of the algorithms
In the previous section we showed that the problem of finding a fair schedule is computationally intractable.
However, the ideas used in the exponential and the FPRAS algorithms can be used as insights to create
reasonable heuristics. In this section we present the experimental evaluation of the fairness of two simple
heuristic algorithms, and several algorithms from the scheduling theory.
7.1 Algorithms
In this section we describe the algorithms that we evaluate.
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REF. We used Algorithm REF from Figure 1 (which is an exponential algorithm) as the referral fair algo-
rithm.
RAND. We used Algorithm RAND from Figure 6 as a heuristic for workloads with jobs having different
sizes. We verify two versions of the algorithm with N = 15 and N = 75 random subcoalitions.
Notation:
own(M), own(J) — the organization owning the processor M , the job J
wait(O) — the set of released, but not-yet scheduled jobs of the organization O at time t
Initialize(C):
foreach O(u) ∈ C do
finUt[O(u)] ← 0; finCon[O(u)]← 0 ;
φ[O(u)] ← 0; ψ[O(u)] ← 0 ;
Schedule(tprev, t): // tprev is the time of the previous event
foreach O(u) ∈ C do
φ[O(u)] ← φ[O(u)] + (t− tprev)finCon[O(u)];
ψ[O(u)] ← ψ[O(u)] + (t− tprev)finUt[O(u)];
γ ← generate a random permutation of the set of all processors;
foreach m ∈ γ do
if not FreeMachine(m, t) then
J ← RunningJob(m);
finUt[own(J)] ← finUt[own(J)] + t− tprev ;
finCon[own(m)] ← finCon[own(m)] + t− tprev ;
φ[own(J)] ← φ[own(J)] + 1
2
(t− tprev)(t− tprev + 1);
ψ[own(m)] ← ψ[own(m)] + 1
2
(t− tprev)(t− tprev + 1);
foreach m ∈ γ do
if FreeMachine(m, t) and
⋃
O(u)
wait(O(u)) 6= ∅ then
org ← argmaxO(u):wait(O(u)) 6=∅(φ[O
(u)]− ψ[O(u)]) ;
J ← first waiting job of org ;
startJob(J , m) ;
finUt[org]← finUt[org] + 1 ;
finCon[own(m)] ← finCon[own(m)] + 1 ;
Figure 9: Algorithm DIRECTCONTR: a heuristic algorithm for fair scheduling.
DIRECTCONTR (the pseudo-code of the algorithm is given in Figure 9). The algorithm keeps for each
organization O its utility ψsp[O] and its estimated contribution φ[O]. The estimate of the contribution of
each organization is assessed directly (without considering any subcoalitions) by the following heuristic.
On each scheduling event t we consider the processors in a random order and assign waiting jobs to free
processors. The job that is started on processor m increases the contribution φ˜ of the owner of m by the
utility of this job.
In the pseudo code, finUt[O] denotes the number of the unit-size parts of the jobs of the organization
O that are completed before tprev. From Equation 3 we know that the utility in time t of the unit-size parts
of the jobs of the organization O that are completed before tprev is greater by (t − tprev)finUt[O] than this
utility in time tprev (line 4); the utility of the unit-size parts of the job completed between tprev and t is
equal to
∑t−tprev
i=1 i =
1
2 (t − tprev)(t − tprev + 1) (line 4). Similarly, finCon[O] denotes the number of
the completed unit-size parts of the jobs processed on the processors of the organization O. The algorithm
updates the utilities and the estimates of the contributions. The waiting jobs are assigned to the processors
in the order of decreasing differences (φ− ψ) of the issuing organizations (similarly to REF).
ROUNDROBIN. The algorithm cycles through the list of organizations to determine the job to be started.
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FAIRSHARE [23]. This is perhaps the most popular scheduling algorithm using the idea of distributive
fairness. Each organization is given a target weight (a share). The algorithm tries to ensure that the resources
used by different organizations are proportional to their shares. More formally, whenever there is a free
processor and some jobs waiting for execution, the algorithm sorts the organizations in the ascending order
of the ratios: the total time of the processor already assigned for the jobs of the organization divided by its
share. A job from the organization with the lowest ratio is started.
In all versions of fair share, in the experiments we set the target share to the fraction of processors
contributed by an organization to the global pool.
UTFAIRSHARE. This algorithm uses the same idea as FAIRSHARE. The only difference is that UTFAIR-
SHARE tries to balance the utilities of the organizations instead of their resource allocation. Thus, in each
step the job of the organization with the smallest ratio of utility to share is selected. We used this algorithm
because it uses the allocation mechanism of FAIRSHARE, but operates on the strategy-proof metric used by
our referral exponential algorithm.
CURRFAIRSHARE. This version of the fair share algorithm does not keep any history; it only ensures that,
for each organization, the number of currently executing jobs is proportional to its target share. We used this
algorithm because, it is light and efficient. It has also an interesting property: the history does not influence
the current schedule. We were curious to check how this property influences the fairness.
7.2 Settings
To run simulations, we chose the following workloads from the Parallel Workload Archive [8]: 1. LPC-
EGEE8 (cleaned version), 2. PIK-IPLEX9, 3. RICC10, 4. SHARCNET-Whale11. We selected traces that
closely resemble sequential workloads (in the selected traces most of the jobs require a single processor).
We replaced parallel jobs that required q > 1 processors with q copies of a sequential job having the same
duration.
In each workload, each job has a user identifier (in the workloads there are respectively 56, 225, 176 and
154 distinct user identifiers). To distribute the jobs between the organizations we uniformly distributed the
user identifiers between the organizations; the job sent by the given user was assigned to the corresponding
organization.
Because REF is exponential, the experiments are computationally-intensive; in most of the experiments,
we simulate only 5 organizations.
The users usually send their jobs in consecutive blocks. We also considered a scenario when the jobs
are uniformly distributed between organizations (corresponding to a case when the number of users within
organizations is large, in which case the distribution of the jobs should be close to uniform). These exper-
iments led to the same conclusions, so we present only the results from the case when the user identifiers
were distributed between the organizations.
For each workload, the total number of the processors in the system was equal to the number originally
used in the workload (that is 70, 2560, 8192 and 3072, respectively). The processors were assigned to
organizations so that the counts follow Zipf and (in different runs) uniform distributions.
For each algorithm, we compared the vector of the utilities (the utilities per organization) at the end of
the simulated time period (a fixed time tend): ~ψ with the vector of the utilities in the ideally fair schedule
~ψ∗ (computed by REF). Let ptot denote the total number of the unit-size parts of the jobs completed in
the fair schedule returned by REF, ptot =
∑
(s,p)∈σ∗:s≤tend
min(p, tend − s). We calculated the difference
8www.cs.huji.ac.il/labs/parallel/workload/l lpc/index.html
9www.cs.huji.ac.il/labs/parallel/workload/l pik iplex/index.html
10www.cs.huji.ac.il/labs/parallel/workload/l ricc/index.html
11www.cs.huji.ac.il/labs/parallel/workload/l sharcnet/index.html
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Table 1: The average delay (or the speed up) of jobs due to the unfairness of the algorithm ∆ψ/ptot for
different algorithms and different workloads. Each row is an average over 100 instances taken as parts of
the original workload. The duration of the experiment is 5 · 104.
LPC-EGEE PIK-IPLEX SHARCNET-Whale RICC
Avg St. dev. Avg St. dev. Avg St. dev. Avg St. dev.
ROUNDROBIN 238 353 6 33 145 38 2839 357
RAND (N = 15) 8 21 0.014 0.01 6 6 162 187
DIRECTCONTR 5 11 0.02 0.15 10 7 537 303
FAIRSHARE 16 25 0.3 1.38 13 8 626 309
UTFAIRSHARE 16 25 0.3 1.38 38 67 515 284
CURRFAIRSHARE 87 106 0.3 1.58 145 80 1231 243
Table 2: The average delay (or the speed up) of jobs due to the unfairness of the algorithm ∆ψ/ptot for
different algorithms and different workloads. Each row is an average over 100 instances taken as parts of
the original workload. The duration of the experiment is 5 · 105.
LPC-EGEE PIK-IPLEX SHARCNET-Whale RICC
Avg St. dev. Avg St. dev. Avg St. dev. Avg St. dev.
ROUNDROBIN 4511 6257 242 1420 404 1221 10850 13773
RAND (N = 15) 562 1670 1.3 7 26 158 771 1479
DIRECTCONTR 410 1083 0.2 1.4 60 204 1808 3397
FAIRSHARE 575 1404 2.3 12 94 307 2746 4070
UTFAIRSHARE 888 2101 1.2 5 120 344 4963 6080
CURRFAIRSHARE 1082 2091 2.2 11 180 805 5387 9083
∆ψ = ‖~ψ − ~ψ∗‖ =
∑
O(u)(ψ
(u) − ψ(u),∗) and compared the values ∆ψ/ptot for different algorithms. The
value ∆ψ/ptot is the measure of the fairness that has an intuitive interpretation. Since delaying each unit-
size part of a job by one time moment decreases the utility of the job owner by one, the value ∆ψ/ptot gives
the average unjustified delay (or unjustified speed-up) of a job due to the unfairness of the algorithm.
7.3 Results
We start with experiments on short sub-traces of the original workloads. We randomly selected the start
time of the experiment tstart and set the end time to tend = tstart + 5 · 104. For each workload we run 100
experiments (on different periods of workloads of length 5 · 104). The average values of ∆ψ/ptot, and the
standard deviations are presented in Table 1.
From this part of the experiments we conclude that: (i) The algorithm RAND is the most fair algorithm
regarding the fairness by the Shapley Value; but RAND is the second most computationally intensive algo-
rithm (after REF). (ii) All the other algorithms are about equally computationally efficient. The algorithm
DIRECTCONTR is the most fair. (iii) The algorithm FAIRSHARE, which is the algorithm mostly used in real
systems, is not much worse than DIRECTCONTR. (iv) Arbitrary scheduling algorithms like ROUNDROBIN
may result in unfair schedules. (v) The fairness of the algorithms may depend on the workload. In RICC the
differences are much more visible than in PIK-IPLEX. Thus, although DIRECTCONTR and FAIRSHARE are
usually comparable, on some workloads the difference is important.
In the second series of experiments, we verified the effect of the duration of the simulated workload on
the resulting fairness measure (the ratio ∆ψ/ptot). As we changed the duration of the experiments from
5 · 104 to 5 · 105, we observed that the unfairness ratio ∆ψ/ptot was increasing. The value of the ratio
for tend − tstart = 5 · 105 are presented in Table 2. The relative quality of the algorithms is the same
as in the previous case. Thus, all our previous conclusions hold. However, now all the algorithms are
significantly less fair than the exact algorithm. Thus, in long-running systems the difference between the
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Figure 10: The effect of the number of the organizations on ratio ∆ψ/ptot.
approaches becomes more important. If there are a few organizations, the exact REF or the randomized
RAND algorithms should be used. In larger systems, when the computational cost of these is too high,
DIRECTCONTR clearly outperforms FAIRSHARE.
Last, we verified the effect of the number of the organizations on the ratio ∆ψ/ptot. The results from the
experiments conducted on LPC-EGEE data set are presented in Figure 10. As the number of organizations
increases, the unfairness ratio ∆ψ/ptot grows; thus the difference between the algorithms is more significant.
This confirms our previous conclusions.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we define the fairness of the scheduling algorithm in terms of cooperative game theory which
allows to quantify the impact of an organization on the utilities of others. We present a non-monetary model
in which it is not required that each organization has accurate valuations of its jobs and resources. We show
that classic utility functions may create incentives for workload manipulations. We thus propose a strategy
resilient utility function that can be thought of as per-organization throughput.
We analyze the complexity of the fair scheduling problem. The general problem is NP-hard and hard
to approximate. Nevertheless, the problem parameterized with the number of organizations is FPT. Also,
the FPT algorithm can be used as a reference for comparing the fairness of different algorithms on small
instances (dozens of organizations). For a special case with unit-size jobs, we propose an FPRAS. In our
experiments, we show that the FPRAS can be used as the heuristic algorithm; we also show another efficient
heuristic. The main conclusion from the experiments is that in multi-organizational systems, the distributive
fairness used by fair share does not result in truly-fair schedules; our heuristic better approximates the
Shapley-fair schedules.
We, further, show that every greedy algorithm achieves at least 34 -times as good resource utilization
as the optimal algorithm. Since this result holds even if the durations and the pattern of incoming jobs are
unknown, and if we use arbitrary underlying scheduling policy, we show that the loss of resources utilization
due to the fairness is upper-bounded by 25%.
Since we do not require the valuation of the jobs, and we consider an on-line, non-clairvoyant schedul-
ing, we believe the presented results have practical consequences for real-life job schedulers.
There are many natural questions for the future work. Although our approach is applicable to the parallel
jobs, and to scheduling on related and unrelated machines, we yet do not know the resulting loss of the global
efficiency. Determining these bounds is an interesting open question. We suspect that in case of related and
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unrelated machines the loss of efficiency might be significant. In such case, the next natural question is
too look for refinements of our algorithm that would allow to alleviate this problem. Another interesting
direction is to explore other game-theoretic notions of fairness.
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